In this paper, we study the problem of privacy-preserving data sharing, wherein only a subset of the records in a database are sensitive, possibly based on predefined privacy policies. Existing solutions, viz, differential privacy (DP), are over-pessimistic and treat all information as sensitive. Alternatively, techniques, like access control and personalized differential privacy, reveal all non-sensitive records truthfully, and they indirectly leak information about sensitive records through exclusion attacks.
INTRODUCTION
Public and private organizations capture and store diverse types of information about individuals that are either obligated to publish or could benefit from sharing with others [20] . A key impediment in sharing is the concern of privacy. For instance, information about visited locations, online purchases, movie preferences [35] , or web searches [5] has been shown to lead to inferences about sensitive properties like health, religious affiliation, or sexual orientation. In recent years, the field of privacy preserving data-sharing has flourished and differential privacy [15] (DP) has emerged as the predominant privacy standard. Informally, DP states that for a database that contains a single record per user, the participation of an individual will change the output of an analysis by a bounded factor proportional to a privacy parameter . Most work in differential privacy (with the exceptions of [4, 21] ) has been developed under the assumption that every record in the database is equally sensitive.
In this work, we depart from the above well trodden path, as we consider data sharing when only part of the data is sensitive, while the remainder (that may consist the majority) is non-sensitive. In real-world scenarios, the sensitive/nonsensitive dichotomy of data is not always apparent, but in certain cases it naturally occurs as a consequence of legislature, personal preferences, convenience, and privacy policies. Example 1. The General Data Protection Regulation [16, 30] (GDPR), that will take effect in European Union (EU) in 2018, imposes strict rules on how information about EU citizens is handled by companies. Individuals must provide an affirmative consent (opt-in) in order to allow the collection and analysis of their data. Additionally, information about minors under 16 years of age can not be stored and processed without parental authorization. Failure to comply with GDPR could ensue a fine of up to 4% of the company's annual turnover. The previous legislative rules can easily be used to classify a citizen's record as sensitive or not.
Example 2. In psychology literature, it is well established that privacy attitudes depend on personal preferences and convenience [2, 3] . In a large scale study in e-commerce [6] , researchers found two major groups of individuals: those who had little to no privacy concerns and the "privacy fundamentalists". Moreover, individuals' tendency to opt-in or opt-out of data sharing is a function of perception of utility offered by an application versus the cost of privacy leakage. Thus, if the gain is sufficient, a big portion of users will willingly release their information.
Example 3. We examine the use case of privacy applications in a smart building management system [13] (SBMS). Such systems, are capable of tracking individuals using indoor localization sensors and devices. The collected information is used to improve the performance of HVAC (heating, ventilation, and air conditioning) subsystems or offer location based services to the tenants, such as allowing to locate each other. SBMS need to comply with legislature, e.g. GDPR, and privacy policies. For instance, individuals should not be tracked in certain locations (e.g. restrooms, smoker lounge, etc.). Additionally, "privacy fundamentalists" can opt-out from the tracking system, at the expense of enjoying only limited services.
In this paper, we use policies as the language for specifying sensitivity. Traditionally, query answering in the presence of policies has been the focus of access control literature [9, 33, 34] . The Truman and non-Truman models [33] are the two primary models for query answering in access control. Based on the Truman model, queries are transparently re-written to ensure users only see what is contained in the authorized view. Thus, the result is correct only with respect to the restricted view. In non-Truman models queries that can not be answered correctly are rejected. However, neither approach guarantees privacy. Consider example 3, where the smoker's lounge is the only sensitive location and Alice is attempting to locate Bob. If Bob is at the sensitive location, the Truman model will return nothing and the non-Truman model will honestly reject the query. Therefore, in both cases, Bob's location is indirectly revealed, because the sensitivity of his record is correlated with the value of the record. This attack is an example of what we call an exclusion attack , which we formally define in section 3.2.
An alternative solution is to directly apply differential privacy. Such an approach would hide all properties of a record (including its sensitivity) and protect against exclusion attacks. However, DP algorithms do not leverage on the fact that part of the data is non-sensitive to lower the error rates of the query answers. In prior work, heterogeneous DP [4] and personalized differential privacy (PDP) [21] have tried to take advantage of different privacy levels between records. Specifically, PDP [21] considers the case where each record r is associated with its own privacy parameter (r). PDP, for instance, allows suppressing records with strong privacy requirements ( (r) < t), and analyzing only the records with weaker privacy requirements using a t-DP algorithm. In this context, if we model non-sensitive records by setting their privacy level to ∞, PDP would release all the non-sensitive records unperturbed (which is an ∞-DP algorithm), which results in an exclusion attack.
In general, the fundamental problem ignored by prior work is that an individual's privacy attitude (and hence the fact that their records is sensitive or non-sensitive) can be correlated with attributes in their record (and whether they are present or absent in the database). For instance in [32] , the authors note that an individual's privacy preferences are correlated to demographic attributes like income, age, and political views. In this paper, we make the following contributions:
1. Motivated by the shortcomings of existing solutions, we introduce one-sided differential privacy (OSDP), a novel privacy definition that provides rigorous privacy guarantees on the sensitive portion of the data, and guards against exclusion attacks.
2. We develop a variant of the randomized response algorithm, that can truthfully release a sample of the nonsensitive data, while satisfying OSDP. We use this to release and analyze mobility trajectories of users in the context of smart buildings. DP algorithms are unable to analyze these data with low error. In contrast, data released under OSDP supports these analyses with reasonably high accuracy, especially when the fraction of sensitive data is small.
3. We propose a new general recipe for adapting DP algorithms for answering counting queries to OSDP. Our approach leverages on the non-sensitive records, and it is able to improve state-of-the-art DP algorithms by up to 25× for certain inputs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present differential privacy and its properties. We define one-sided differential privacy in Section 3, prove its composition properties, and discuss its relation to similar privacy definitions. In Section 3, we also formalize the exclusion attack and we show how OSDP protects against it. Section 4 contains an algorithm for releasing true data under OSDP. In Section 5, we shift our focus on releasing counting queries under OSDP. In Section 6, we empirically evaluate our algorithms. Section 7 contains interesting new directions of research and extensions to OSDP. In Section 8, we summarize our contributions and experimental results.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce differential privacy (DP), its composition properties, and a basic mechanism that satisfies differential privacy.
We adopt the bounded model of differential privacy [14] . Let T be the universe of records, D be a database defined as a multiset of records r ∈ T , and D be the universe of all possible databases. 
Where the probabilities are taken over coin tosses of M.
In DP, plays the role of a privacy knob -with lower values corresponding to higher levels of privacy.
A consequence of Theorem 2.1 is that complex DP algorithms can be designed by sequentially composing simpler algorithms on the data. For this reason, it is useful to consider the privacy parameter as a privacy budget that we slowly spend by performing private analyses on the data. Definition 2.3 (Laplace Distribution). The probability density function of the Laplace distribution with mean µ and scale β is:
For the remainder, we use Lap(β) to denote a random variable drawn from the Laplace distribution with mean µ = 0 and scale β. Definition 2.4 (Sensitivity). Given a function f : D → R, the sensitivity of f is:
Sensitivity is a property of a numerical function f , as it is an upper bound to the output of f between any two neighboring databases. The Laplace mechanism satisfies -differential privacy [14] and is the standard mechanism for providing DP on tasks f whose output is either a scalar or a vector of real numbers.
ONE-SIDED PRIVACY
In this section, we formally define one-sided differential privacy (OSDP). In subsection 3.2, we define the exclusion attack, and we prove that OSDP protects against it. Furthermore, in subsection 3.3, we examine the composition properties of OSDP and in 3.4 we compare and contrast OSDP with related work.
Definition
Definition 3.1 (Policy Function). A policy function P : T → {0, 1} denotes whether a record r ∈ T is sensitive (P (r) = 0) or non-sensitive (P (r) = 1).
A policy function (or simply policy) classifies database records as either sensitive or non-sensitive, examples of policy functions include:
• λr.if (r.Age ≤ 17) : 0; else : 1 encodes the policy that records corresponding to minors are sensitive.
• λr.if (r.Race = N ativeAmerican ∨ r.Optin = F alse) : 0; else : 1 implies that all records who have either opted out, or are native Americans are sensitive.
Policies considered in this work are non-trivial i.e., they result in at least one sensitive and one non-sensitive record. If all records are sensitive the private analysis can be done with standard DP algorithms. Conversely, if all records are non-sensitive then any non-private algorithm can be used.
Our goal is to design a privacy definition that provides a rigorous privacy guarantee for the sensitive records (i.e., {r : P (r) = 0} ∀r∈D ). Towards that goal, we define one-sided neighboring databases under policy P . 
Essentially, OSDP provides an indistinguishability property similar to DP, but only for the sensitive records. As we show in section 3.2, OSDP mechanisms not only "hide" the value of sensitive records, but also the fact that they are sensitive or not. Lastly, OSDP does not constraint the information leakage of non-sensitive records as long as the privacy of the sensitive records is preserved.
OSDP and the Exclusion Attack
In this subsection, we (a) formalize the notion of freedom from exclusion attacks, (b) show that prior work fails to satisfy it, and (c) show that all one-sided differentially private algorithms satisfy it. Exclusion Attacks: Informally, by exclusion attack we refer to attacks where adversaries decrease their uncertainty about the value of a sensitive record when that record is excluded from a private release. In example 3, if smoker's lounge is the only sensitive location, then excluding Bob's data leaks information about his presence in the smoker's lounge. We formalize the concept of exclusion attacks by formalizing its converse -i.e., when a mechanism is free of exclusion attacks.
First we specify the background information of an adversary. Let θ be a probability distribution that describes the prior knowledge of an adversary. In general θ can be any arbitrary function that maps a database to a real number in [0, 1], i.e., θ : T n → [0, 1]. Informally, a mechanism M satisfies freedom from exclusion attacks if an attacker's certainty about whether a target record is sensitive increases by at most a bounded amount after accessing M's output. We now formalize freedom from exclusion attack .
Definition 3.4 (φ-Freedom from Exclusion Attacks).
A mechanism M satisfies φ-freedom from exclusion attacks for policy P and parameter φ if:
Where r is the target record, x is a value that makes the record sensitive, y is another value in the domain, and θ is the adversary's prior about the database.
The definition states that the adversary should not reduce his uncertainty about whether a record is sensitive after seeing the output of the mechanism by more than a multiplicative factor of e φ . It follows, that a mechanism that reveals all non-sensitive records is not free from exclusion attacks, since there are datasets and outputs where P θ (r = y|M(D) ∈ O) becomes 0 for values y that are non-sensitive according to the policy, resulting in an unbounded posterior odds-ratio. OSDP and Freedom from Exclusion Attacks: Any mechanism that satisfies (P, )-OSDP also satisfies -freedom from exclusion attacks as long as the attacker does not know any correlations between the target record and the rest of the database. Suppose Θ denotes the set of probability distributions over databases of the form θ(D) = t∈D θ(t), where θ(t) is the adversary's prior for tuple t. then we can show the following: Theorem 3.1. A mechanism satisfying (P, )-OSDP satisfies -freedom from exclusion attacks for policy P for all adversaries whose prior can be expressed as a product of priors over individual records (i.e., θ ∈ Θ).
Proof. Since the adversary's prior can be decomposed into a product of priors over individual records, we can show that:
where D is a database where record r takes the value x and D is a database where record r takes the value y. These are precisely neighboring databases under OSDP (when x is a sensitive record, and y is an arbitrary record). Thus,
The above proof also shows that all DP mechanisms also satisfy -freedom from exclusion attacks for any policy. The assumption that the adversary does not know any correlations between the target record and the rest of the database is critical. Prior work has shown a "No Free Lunch Theorem" [24] that states that any mechanism that ensures properties of records are protected against all possible adversaries can not necessarily provide any useful information about the data. To illustrate this, consider an -differentially private mechanism that releases the number of non-sensitive records (using the Laplace mechanism). Suppose the adversary knows that either all the records are sensitive, or all the records are non-sensitive. Under such a strongly correlated prior, the adversary can tell with high probability whether a target record is sensitive (when the noisy count is close to 0) or not. Thus, useful mechanisms can only ensure freedom from exclusion attacks under some assumption on the attacker prior. We prove freedom from exclusion attack under the independence assumption (which is the standard assumption used when proving semantic privacy properties of differential privacy [25] ). Considering freedom from exclusion attacks when records are correlated is an interesting direction for future work.
Composition
Much like DP, one-sided differential privacy also composes with itself. First we define policy relaxations, which will help us to compose OSDP instantiations with different policies.
Definition 3.5 (Policy Relaxation). Let P1, P2 be two policy functions. P1 is a relaxation of P2, denoted as P1 p P2, if and only if for every record r, P1(r) ≥ P2(r).
If P1 is a relaxation of P2, then every record that is sensitive under P1 is also sensitive under P2. We also say that P1 is weaker than P2 or P2 is stricter than P1. Relaxing the policy also results in a weaker privacy definition.
Theorem 3.2 (Privacy Relaxation
We next define the minimum relaxation of a pair of policies that are not relaxations of each other. Definition 3.6 (Minimum Relaxation). Let P1, . . . , P k be a set of policy functions. We define the minimum relaxation as the policy function Pmr such that for every record r, Pmr(r) = max(P1(r), . . . , P k (r)).
The minimum relaxation of two policies, P1, P2 classifies as sensitive the records that are sensitive under both policies. Records that are deemed non-sensitive by either P1 or P2 are considered non-sensitive by Pmr(r). Pmr is the strictest policy that is a relaxation of both P1 and P2. When P1 = P2, then Pmr = P1 = P2. We are now ready to define the sequential composition theorem for OSDP.
Proof. According to Theorem 3.2, every algorithm Mi satisfies (Pmr, i)-OSDP. Let D be a database and D ∈ NP mr (D), then
Thus M satisfies (Pmr, i i)-OSDP.
Connection with other Privacy Definitions
In this subsection, we discuss the connection of OSDP with other three similar privacy definitions: differential privacy, personalized differential privacy and blowfish privacy. Differential Privacy: OSDP is a generalization of differential privacy; the latter is a special case of the former when every record is sensitive as shown below. Definition 3.7 (All Sensitive Policy). Let P all denote the policy function that classifies every record as sensitive.That is, P all (r) = 0, ∀r. We call this the all sensitive policy. Lemma 3.1. Any -differential private mechanism also satisfies (P, )-OSDP for any policy function P .
Proof. An -differentially private algorithm satisfies (P all , )-OSDP. Every policy P is a relaxation of P all . Thus, by Theorem 3.2, a mechanism that satisfies -differential private also satisfies (P, )-OSDP. Lemma 3.2. Any (P all , )-OSDP private mechanism also satisfies -differential privacy.
Proof. Neighboring datasets under DP (Def. 2.1) are also P all -one-sided neighbors (Def. 3.2). Then any mechanism that satisfies -indistinguishability between any two P allone-sided neighboring datasets also satisfies -indistinguishability between any two neighboring datasets.
Differential privacy is the strictest form of OSDP and any differential private algorithm will also satisfy any version of one-sided differential privacy for the same . Personalized Differential Privacy (PDP) [21] : In PDP different records in the dataset are allowed different levels of privacy. This is modeled by a publicly known function Φ that associates records r with a personalized privacy level Φ(r) = r -i.e., every record must publicly "declare" its privacy level independent of its value. However, in the privacy model of OSDP the fact that a record is sensitive or not is secret. This the key distinction between OSDP and PDP.
To explain this further, while it seems one can model (P, )-OSDP using PDP with function ΦP that associates sensitive records with privacy parameter , and non-sensitive records with a privacy parameter of ∞, we can construct mechanisms that satisfy ΦP -PDP, but not (P, )-OSDP. For example, consider the following algorithm: Suppress that picks a threshold τ , suppresses all sensitive records with privacy parameter r < τ , and then runs a τ -differentially private computation on the rest of the records. Then for τ = ∞ Suppress will suppress all sensitive records and permit the release of the non-sensitive records with no perturbation. While Suppress satisfies ΦP -PDP, since it is a special case of the Threshold algorithm [21] , it fails to satisfy OSDP.
A second key difference is that while all OSDP mechanisms enjoy -freedom from exclusion attacks, PDP is a definition that allows algorithms that are susceptible to exclusion attacks. It naturally follows from Definition 3.4 that Suppress with τ = ∞ is vulnerable to exclusion attacks. Even in the case where one chooses a large but finite value for τ , Suppress satisfies Definition 3.4 only for φ = τ and hence does not satisfy (P, )-OSDP, which requires all mechanisms to satisfy freedom from exclusion attacks for φ = .
Theorem 3.4. The Suppress algorithm with threshold τ satisfies freedom from exclusion attack for φ = τ .
Since Suppress provides a τ indistinguishability property for the non-sensitive records, it follows that it only enjoys τ -freedom of exclusion attacks. We defer details of the proof to the full paper. Blowfish Privacy [17, 19] : Recent work has considered generalizations of differential privacy by modifying the notion of neighboring datasets. One example is Blowfish Privacy, where the notion of neighboring datasets is captured using a graph theoretic construct also called a policy. Unlike an OSDP policy, which encodes whether a record is sensitive or not, a Blowfish policies specify which properties of records are sensitive (for instance, whether neighboring databases must differ in the entire record, or just in a single attribute of a record). While OSDP policies provide varied privacy protection to different records, Blowfish policies permit the same level of privacy for all records. Finally, unlike OSDP, in Blowfish privacy the resulting neighboring database relation is symmetric. Other Related Work: In [8] the authors consider a new privacy model for releasing exact value of outliers in a datastream while preserving the privacy of the rest of the data. We conjecture that releasing exact values of outliers leads to vulnerability to exclusion attacks to the rest of the records and defer a full proof as future work. Our notion of exclusion attacks is also reminiscent of how denial of query answering reveals information about records in the context of query auditing. To limit this leakage simulatable auditing has been proposed [23] but the algorithms proposed in that work cannot be applied in our setting. Lastly, in [11] , [10] the authors consider the private release of data where only a subset of the attributes are sensitive. This is in contrast to the data model we adopt where the sensitive/non-sensitive distinction occurs on a per tuple basis. Note that unlike OSDP, the privacy notions proposed in these papers are defined as properties of the output of a mechanism, do not support composition properties, and do not protect against adversaries with side information.
RELEASING TRUE DATA
In this section, we introduce OsdpRR, a randomized response based algorithm that satisfies OSDP. OsdpRR works by releasing a true sample of the non-sensitive records in the database. The ability to output a true data sample, while ensuring privacy, enables a new class of privacy preserving analysis tasks that require true data records. Examples of such tasks include the creation of extractive summaries [27, 36] , classification, or releasing histograms over very large domains and with very large sensitivity. In Section 6.3, we empirically show the advantages of using OsdpRR for the last two cases.
if P (r) = 1 then 4:
S ← S ∪ {r} with probability 1 − e − 5: end if 6: end for 7: return S OsdpRR is described in Algorithm 1. The inputs to OsdpRR are a database D, a policy function P , and the privacy parameter . In lines 2 to 6, OsdpRR iterates through every record in the database. Non-sensitive records, i.e. P (r) = 1, are added to the output set S with probability equal to 1 − e − . In all other cases the record is ignored.
Proof. Let D be a database with size equal to 1, i.e., it contains a single record. In that case we represent neighboring databases as records r, r . There are only two possible outputs, either release record r or suppress it (that we denote as OsdpRR(r) = ∅). If r is non-sensitive then r has no neighbors (see Definition 3.2). Thus, we are interested only in cases that r is sensitive (P (r) = 0) and r is any possible record, such that r = r . Based on OsdpRR's possible outputs, we have the following cases: Case 1: OsdpRR(r ) = r and r is sensitive. If r is sensitive Pr[OsdpRR(r) = r] = 0, thus equation (1) holds trivially. Case 2.1: OsdpRR(r ) = ∅ and r , r are sensitive.
Case 2.2: OsdpRR(r ) = ∅ and r is sensitive, r is non sensitive. This concludes the proof for the case that |D| = 1. Next, we extend the proof for any possible database size. Let D, D be two neighbors, that differ on the k th record. Let S = {s1, s2, . . .} be a possible output, with si being the output for the i th record. Since OsdpRR makes independent decisions for each record, we have the same result whether OsdpRR is applied to the complete database or each record separately. Thus we have
This concludes the proof.
The probability distribution of the sample size, released by OsdpRR, is the Bernoulli distribution with probability of success equal to 1 − e − and number of trials equal to the number of non-sensitive records. Table 1 shows the expected percentage of released non-sensitive data as a function of privacy parameter . For equal to 1.0, the percentage is as high as 63%, while for low epsilon values ( = 0.1), the percentage drops to approximately 9.5%.
ANSWERING COUNTING QUERIES
We shift our focus on the task of releasing histograms over a dataset. We define a histogram query to be a set of counts defined over a non-overlapping partitioning of the dataset. One could think of a histogram query as:
SELECT group, COUNT(*) FROM TABLE WHERE condition GROUP BY keys where the output reports all groups with both zero and nonzero counts.
Histogram estimation under differential privacy is a well researched area with rich literature to draw from. Hay et al [18] present a near-complete benchmark comparison of differentially private algorithms. The algorithms examined in [18] are sophisticated, over-engineered algorithms that permit the release of accurate low-dimensional histogramsspecifically, 1-or 2-dimensional histograms with the number of bins in the thousands. As shown in Lemma 3.1, any DP algorithm for histogram release will satisfy OSDP. In this section, we develop OSDP algorithms that leverage on the presence of non-sensitive records to provide lower error than even the state-of-the-art DP algorithms for this task.
One would expect that in the presence of non-sensitive records histogram release becomes automatically easier, but this is not the case as we identify two main issues with releasing histogram estimates under OSDP. First, even in the presence of a single sensitive record the global sensitivity of releasing a count is still 1 (and the sensitivity of a histogram is still 2). In Section 5.1 we show that the sensitivity can be reduced by answering queries only on non-sensitive records. This helps when some of the bins in the histogram have exclusively sensitive records and some bins have exclusively non-sensitive records. We can then use a DP algorithm for the bins with sensitive records, and an OSDP algorithm (from Section 5.1) for bins with non-sensitive records. However, in most cases, every bin the histogram could have a mix of sensitive and non-sensitive records. This occurs, for instance, when the policy is derived from an opt-in/optout scenario. Another example is when the policy depends on a single attribute (like race), while the histogram is constructed on a different attribute (like age). This might result in big discrepancies between the distribution of non-sensitive records and the distribution of sensitive records and using just non-sensitive records as a proxy for the entire data will result in high error. For such cases, in Section 5.2 we present a general recipe for improving the error of state-of-the-art DP algorithms by leveraging non-sensitive records, and relaxing their privacy guarantee to OSDP.
OSDP Primitives
OsdpRR can be used to release histograms by running the query on the sample of non-sensitive records output by OsdpRR. However, this approach can be worse than the Laplace mechanism in many cases.
Theorem 5.1. Let n = |D| denote the number of records in database D, and d denote the number of bins in the histogram query. Then the expected L1 error of computing the histogram on the output of an OsdpRR algorithm that satisfies (P, )-OSDP is higher than the expected L1 error of Laplace mechanism that satisfied -DP, whenever:
Proof. The expected L1 error of Laplace mechanism is 2d/ . In the case of OSDP, error is due to (a) the suppression of all sensitive records, and (b) suppression of n · e − non-sensitive records. Even if the number of sensitive records tends to zero, the L1 error of OsdpRR is at least n · e − .
For instance, a 2-d histogram query over a uniform grid that divides each dimension into 100 disjoint bins would have d = 10
4 . When = .1, OsdpRR will have higher error than the Laplace mechanism if n > 2.2 × 10 5 . For the remainder we use x to denote the histogram over all records in D, and xns over the non-sensitive records of D alone. Note that under OSDP, a database D ∈ NP (D) is a neighbor of D in one of two ways: (a) a sensitive record in D is replaced with another sensitive record in D , or (b) a sensitive record in D is replaced with a non-sensitive record in D . Thus, if xns (x ns) denotes the output of a histogram query over the non-sensitive records of D (D , resp.), then the neighboring histograms differ in at most one count, and all counts in x ns are no smaller than the counts in xns. Thus, we can release histogram counts on the non-sensitive records by adding one-sided Laplace noise to ensure OSDP. The one-sided Laplace distribution, Lap−(λ), is the mirrored version of exponential distribution with scale equal to λ, where all the mass is on the negative values.
Definition 5.1 (One-Sided Laplace Distribution). The probability density function of the One-Sided Laplace Distribution is:
The OsdpLaplace answers queries by adding one-sided noise to the query answer computed only using non-sensitive records. 
It is easy to see that the OsdpLaplace mechanism introduces noise with 1/8 the variance of the differentially private Laplace mechanism. The exponential distribution has half the variance, and another factor of 4 reduction in variance comes from the sensitivity dropping from 2 (in the case of DP) to 1 (in the case of OSDP). The error can be further reduced by using the following algorithm that we call OsdpLaplaceL1 that leverages the fact that all input counts are non-negative. Step 2 of the algorithm sets all negative counts after adding noise to 0. Note that after this step, every count in xns that was originally 0 is also output as 0. However, there could be other bins that are output as 0 (since their noisy count was negative). Next, note that the one-sided Laplace distribution is not unbiased, step 4 adds back the median value µ of a one-sided Laplace random variable to make the positive noisy counts unbiased. While OsdpLaplace and OsdpLaplaceL1 add significantly lower noise than the Laplace mechanism, they can have higher overall error than the Laplace mechanism since they only use the non-sensitive records to answer queries.
A Recipe for OSDP Algorithms
We now explore how to utilize the rich literature of DP algorithms in order to build new OSDP algorithms that take advantage of the presence of non-sensitive records in order to reduce the added noise when applicable.
We focus on an important class of DP algorithms for histogram release that can be abstracted to two distinct phases. In the first phase they query a set of statistics on the data and learn an underlying model of it. Then they use the learnt model and the Laplace mechanism to add noise to a set of associated aggregate counts which will be used to estimate the private histogram. Examples of these algorithms include: PrivBayes [37] for high dimensional histograms, AGrid [28] for 2 dimensional histograms, AHP [38] for general histograms, and DAWA for 1 and 2 dimensional histograms. Algorithms of this type can be extended under OSDP in the following way.
The naive extension replaces the noise addition step with an OSDP primitive and changes the input histogram to xns. This extension is easy to implement as it treats the underlying DP algorithm as a black box, requiring from the user just a minor change. However, it suffers from the same problem other OSDP primitives do: if x and xns are dissimilar then the incurred error will be high.
We now describe our second, more elaborate extension that enhances the performance of established DP algorithms for releasing histograms. Let A be a two-phase algorithm as described earlier, we extend it as follows. First, we dedicate a fraction ρ of the privacy budget to release the histogram of xns using an OSDP primitive from section 5.1. We use this noisy histogram to compute the set of zero count bins Z. Then, we use the rest of the privacy budget to run the algorithm A. At the end of this process we get a set of zero bins Z generated under (P, ρ · )-OSDP, and the noisy output of A under (1 − ρ) -DP. Before releasing the final noisy histogram, we add a post-processing step that (a) sets to zero all the counts of bins in Z, (b) uses the learned model to update the rest of the counts accordingly i.e., we redistribute the value of the counts we removed. By sequential composition the entire algorithm satisfies (P, )-OSDP.
We apply this second technique to extend the DAWA algorithm, the state-of-the-art DP algorithm for this task [18] . We leave extensions of other algorithms as an interesting direction of future work. We call this new OSDP algorithm DAWAz (Alg. 3). DAWAz executes an OSDP subroutine to get the zero count cells Z and executes DAWA on the full histogram to getx. Then, DAWAz examines the noisy estimate returned from the OSDP subroutine, finds the bins with 0 count and replaces their values onx with 0. Lastly, for every DAWA partition DAWAz finds the number of replaced bins in that partition and reallocates the mass total count of the partition to the non replaced bins.
Theorem 5.3. DAWAz satisfies (P, )-OSDP.
Proof. Running the OSDP algorithm satisfies (P, ρ· )-OSDP, while the histogram construction using DAWA satisfies (1 − ρ) -DP. The rest of the algorithm is post-processing. Thus, the proof follows from sequential composition theorem.
EXPERIMENTS
We use real and benchmark datasets to empirically demonstrate that the OSDP algorithms presented in this paper permit accurate data analysis of private datasets by leveraging the presence of non-sensitive records. We show: Algorithm 3 DAWAz(x, xns, , ρ)
xns ← Osdp(xns, 1) 4:x ← DAWA(x, 2) 5: Z = {i |xns = 0} 6: ∀i ∈ Z :xi = 0 7: Let B the set of partitions returned from DAWA. 8: for ∀B ∈ B do 9:
rescale ratio = |B| |Z∩B|
10:
∀i ∈ B :xi =xi · rescale ratio 11: end for 12: returnx
• OsdpRR allows the release of true data records, which permits building classifiers with high accuracy close to that of a non-private baseline (Section 6.3.1). In contrast, a state of the art DP classifier (that considers all the data as sensitive) has accuracy close to that of a baseline that does not have access to the data.
• OsdpRR's output also permits releasing high dimensional histograms with an order of magnitude smaller error than that of a DP algorithm on the same data (Section 6.3.2)
• We also consider answering low dimensional histogram queries, a task where over-engineered DP algorithms achieve highly competitive error rates. We show that OSDP algorithms outperform state of the art DP algorithms (Section 6.3.3). In a comparison of 4 OSDP algorithms and 2 DP algorithms on a set of benchmark datasets, DAWAz has on average less than 2× the error compared to the optimal error achieved by any one of these algorithms. In contrast, the state-of-the-art DP algorithm for this task DAWA, incurs 6× the error of the optimal (Fig. 7a) . In some cases we observe that OSDP algorithms achieve up to 25× lower error rate than DAWA (Fig. 9a) .
We describe the datasets and the policy functions used in Section 6.1, the analysis tasks in Section 6.2, and the results in Section 6.3.
Datasets and Privacy Policies
We use two datasets: TIPPERS, a real dataset from a live IoT testbed under development at UCI [1] , and DPBench-1D, a set of 7 one-dimensional real histograms, used to benchmark the performance of DP algorithms [18, 26] .
TIPPERS
Dataset: The TIPPERS dataset consists of a trace of distinct devices connected to 64 Wi-Fi access points located in the Bren Hall building at UC Irvine collected over a 9 month period from January to September of 2016. Each Wi-Fi trace consist of a triple AP mac, device mac, timestamp 1 and we use them to construct a total of 585K unique daily trajectories with 16K unique users. Users might connect to the same access point multiple times, or might cross areas covered by multiple access points. To address this, we discretized time to 10 minute intervals and set the location at each interval as the most frequent access point during that time. 1 the device mac is pseudo-anonymized to meet the IRB requirements for this study Privacy Policy: We consider a user's daily trajectory as the object of privacy protection. Thus, neighboring databases under DP differ in a single user's daily trajectory on a specific day. This protects all properties of an individual within the time period of a specific day. We use access-point level policies to partition the dataset to its sensitive and nonsensitive parts. More specifically, our policies assume a sensitive set of access points (e.g., lounge or restroom) and classify as sensitive all trajectories that pass at least once through a sensitive access point. Based on this general recipe we define a policy Pρ, that results in a non-sensitive dataset with ρ/100 share of non-sensitive records (e.g., P99 results in a dataset with 99% non-sensitive daily trajectories). In our experiments we use ρ = {99, 90, 75, 50, 25, 10, 1} to capture different fractions of non-sensitive records.
DPBench-1D
Dataset: We use the DPBench benchmark datasets [18] to evaluate the performance of our algorithms for the task of releasing 1-D histograms. This benchmark has a collection of 7 datasets. Tuples in each of these datasets are drawn from a categorical domain with size 4,096. The datasets are of varying scales (i.e., number of records), sparsity (i.e., fraction of the total domain that does not appear in the active domain of the dataset) and shape (i.e., empirical distribution), as detailed in table 2. Privacy Policy: These datasets were originally used to benchmark DP algorithms, and hence do not have any notion of a policy. We simulate opt-in/opt-out policies by sampling a subset of the records as non-sensitive. We denote by x the true histogram (on d = 4096 bins), and by xns the histogram over the non-sensitive records. We use two biased sampling methods to generate xns: MSampling, where the empirical distribution of xns is close to that of x, and HiLoSampling, where the empirical distribution of xns significantly differs from that of x. MSampling simulates the scenario when an individual's opt-in/opt-out preference has a low correlation with their value, while HiLoSampling simulates the case where the privacy preference is highly correlated with the individual's record value. We call the former policy Close, and the latter policy Far.
MSampling takes as input a histogram x, a sampling ratio ρx, and a parameter θ, and outputs x , a sample of x with x 1 = ρx x 1. The mean µ and the standard deviation σ of x are within a 1 ± θ multiplicative factor of the mean µ and standard deviation σ of x. We use θ = 0.1.
HiLoSampling works differently, its input is again the histogram x and the sampling ratio ρx and two additional parameters γ > 1 and β. This technique partitions the domain of the histogram into "High" and "Low" regions.
The algorithm picks a bin b at random and sets the bins in the range b ± d · β as "High" bins. Every bin not in the High region is automatically in the Low region. Then, we proceed by sampling with replacement from bins of the histogram, bins of the "High" area are sampled with weight γ , while bins of the "Low" area are sampled with weight 1. Choosing a high γ and a smaller β allows us to create an xns that is highly dissimilar from x. We set γ = 5 and β = .4.
For each policy, we use 7 different values of ρx: {0.99, 0.90, 0.75,0.50, 0.25, 0.10, 0.01}. Thus, for each of the 7 datasets we have 7 × 2 = 14 different non-sensitive histograms for a total of 98 (x, xns) pairs to evaluate our algorithms on.
Analysis Tasks
Classification: First we consider a classification task on the TIPPERS dataset: based on a user's daily trajectory we classify whether the user is a resident or a visitor. More specifically, we learn a logistic regression (LR) model to predict whether a daily trajectory corresponds to a resident. Due to IRB restrictions, we do not have access to the true identities of the owners of each device mac in the data. For that reason, to create the training data we classify as residents owners of device mac that (a) visit Bren Hall at least 10 days per month for the last 5 months and either (b) work beyond 7pm once a week, or (c) work more than 6 hours at once per week; every other user is classified as a visitor. In total, we detected 381 residents that correspond to ∼ 43K daily trajectories (out of ∼ 553K total daily trajectories). We use the following features derived from the daily trajectories: duration of stay at Bren Hall, distinct number of access points visited during a day, and the number of times each individual access point is visited in a trajectory. We also consider frequent patterns of the form (AP1, AP2, AP3) from the trajectories. A trajectory satisfies a frequent pattern if it visits the three access points during the day at consecutive time intervals. We chose patterns that appear in at least 50 trajectories and construct a feature for each pattern using the number of times the pattern appears in a daily trajectory.
We evaluate the performance of all LR classifiers using the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve, that is created by plotting the true positive rate versus the false positive rate for multiple thresholds over the probability of predicting a test record as belonging to a resident. The accuracy is usually reported using the average area under the ROC curve (AUC) over 10-fold cross validation, which is a value between [0, 1]. We report 1.0 − AUC as a measure of prediction error. High Dimensional Histograms: We also consider the task of privately releasing high dimensional histograms on the TIPPERSdataset. More specifically, we consider the number of distinct users for every n consecutive access points in a trajectory (i.e., the n-gram). This is a highly non-trivial task since (a) the domain size for an n-gram is 64 n and (b) the histogram over all bins has sensitivity 64 n since a user might appear in all n-grams. We use the mean relative error (MRE) to measure the quality of our private n-gram estimates. More specifically, for a histogram x of size d and its private estimatex, we have:
In our experiments, we set δ = 1 and report the average MRE over 10 independent executions. Low Dimensional Histograms: We also evaluate our algorithms on releasing 1 and 2-D histograms under OSDP. Our goal is twofold, we want to: evaluate the performance of OSDP algorithms in a realistic scenario and explore under which conditions OSDP algorithms offer advantages over their DP counterparts. Towards these goals we use histograms from both the benchmark datasets and TIPPERS. More specifically, we used TIPPERSto generate a 2-D histogram that contains the number of distinct users that connected to every access point and for every hour of a single day. For the DPBench-1D datasets, we consider the task of releasing 1-D histograms. In addition to MRE defined earlier, we also use per bin-relative error to measure the utility of the algorithms. Per-bin relative error is defined as a vector with the same size as the input histogram, and contains one relative error value per bin. More specifically:
We report the median (Rel50) and 95% (Rel95) of the perbin relative error to capture the average and worst-case empirical per-bin errors. For our experiments we ran each algorithm 10 times on each input and estimate the value of the loss function by taking the average across the executions, we also use δ = 1.0.
Experimental Results

Classification
Algorithms: We compare four algorithms. 1) All NS is a baseline that does not satisfy OSDP that runs a non-private classifier on all the non-sensitive records. This captures the threshold algorithm that satisfies personalized DP [21] .
Recall that personalized DP is susceptible to the exclusion attack. 2) OsdpRR is our OSDP strategy of releasing true non-sensitive records using OsdpRR and then running a non-private classifier. 3) ObjDP is an implementation of the objective perturbation technique for differentially private empirical risk minimization [12] . As prescribed by the authors, we normalized feature vectors to ensure the norm is bounded by 1 before running the method on our dataset. 4) Random is a baseline that randomly predicts a label based on just the label distribution (and ignoring all the features).
P 99 P 90 P 75 P 50 P 25 P Results: In Figure 1 , we report the error (1−AUC) for the policies described in Section 6.1.1 for two levels of privacy budget, = 1.0 and = 0.01. In each figure, we plot All NS and OsdpRR using bars, as their accuracy differs based on the fraction of non-sensitive records in the dataset. We report the error of ObjDP and Random using a straight line. We see that OsdpRRachieves as low an error as the nonprivate baseline All NS, and the absolute errors are close to 10%. As expected, as the fraction of non-sensitive records decreases the error increases (as the number of records used by both All NS and OsdpRRto train the LR model decreases). ObjDP has high error close to that of the Random baseline. This shows that treating all records as sensitive results in a high error and OSDP algorithms alleviate this problem by leveraging on non-sensitive records.
High Dimensional Histograms
Algorithms: As noted earlier, under DP the sensitivity of an n-gram histogram is 64 n . for that reason, we use truncation [22] and choose at most k n-grams from each daily trajectory. This step reduces the sensitivity of releasing the n-gram to 2 · k. We report the MRE of the Laplace mechanism with truncation of k = 1 (denoted by LM T1). We also report the MRE of Laplace mechanism with the optimal choice of k for truncation (denoted by LM T*), this approach does not satisfy DP. Given the high domain size, it is intractable to materialize and perturb the complete histogram for LM when n is large. In our experiments, we only materialize non-zero counts, so for the MRE computation we analytically computed the contribution of the zero counts to it.
P99 P90 P75 P50 P25 P10 P1
Policies Results: In Figures 2, 3 , we plot the MRE error of the 4-grams and 5-grams for all policies considered. We report All NS and OsdpRRerror using bars, and the errors of LM T1 and LM T* using straight lines -since the DP algorithms' error is independent of the policy used. We observed that the optimal choice of truncation parameter k for the 4-and 5-gram counting task was k = 1. We see that All NS has error smaller than OsdpRR, but the difference is not too large when there are 10-50% sensitive records in the dataset. When = 1, LM algorithms has error comparable to OsdpRR, when 50% of the records are non-sensitive. For = 0.01, the LM algorithms have an order of magnitude poorer performance than the OsdpRR algorithm. Thus, we see again that leveraging on the presence of nonsensitive records results in significant utility gains. We did not consider more sophisticated DP techniques for releasing high-dimensional histograms. We believe their error will also be an order of magnitude larger than the OSDP algorithm, since they will also have to contend with the high sensitivity and would need to use truncation.
Low Dimensional Histograms
Algorithms: For the task of releasing low dimensional histograms, we compare a total of 4 OSDP and 2 DP algorithms. The DP algorithms are: Laplace mechanism and DAWA, the state of the art DP algorithm for this task according to a recent benchmark study [18] . The OSDP algorithms are: OsdpRR, OsdpLaplace, OsdpLaplaceL1 and DAWAz. For DAWAz we used ρ = 0.1 fraction of the privacy budget to run OsdpRR to estimate the set of zero counts in the histogram. Figure 4 reports the mean relative error for two different values of the privacy parameter: ∈ {1, 0.01} across all policies. We see that for = 1 the OSDP algorithms outperform the DP algorithm for policies with more than 25% non-sensitive records, but for smaller fractions the DP algorithm is clearly more competitive. The insight from this result is that for datasets with mainly sensitive records, using a DP algorithm is preferable. In Fig. 4b we report our findings for = 0.01 where again the OSDP algorithm OsdpLaplaceL1 is outperformed from the DP algorithm at the same 25% mark, but this time DAWAz is highly competitive for all policies. This is because the OSDP subroutine of DAWAz over-reports zero bin counts, which is better than adding high scale noise to the true bin counts. For brevity in the rest of our results we report only policies with more than 25% fraction of non-sensitive records and for = 1.
In figures 5a and 5b we report the median and 95% per bin relative error. Overall we see that across error metrics, OSDP algorithms offer significant improvements over DAWA for all fractions of non-sensitive values. Even when only half the data records are non-sensitive we see that OSDP algorithms achieve better error rates in MRE and REL95, which means that the OSDP algorithms have an advantage in reporting counts of bins with otherwise high error. Note that DAWAz is not as competitive as we would expect and is outperformed from OspLaplaceL1. The main reason is that the policy in the TIPPERS dataset is value based. So some histogram bins contain only sensitive records, while others only consist of non-sensitive records. So OsdpLaplaceL1 is able to add normal Laplace noise to the sensitive buckets (ensuring DP) and one-sided noise to nonsensitive buckets (ensuring OSDP). The overall algorithm ensures OSDP by sequential composition. In this set of experiments, our goal is to analyze the performance of DP and OSDP algorithms for varying levels of the closeness of the non-sensitive histogram and the nonsensitive ratio. Closeness shows how similar x and xns are, and the non-sensitive ratio ρx = xns 1/ x 1 denotes the portion of tuples in xns. Note that since we report aggregate results of similar inputs (e.g., group inputs by policy), the aggregated value of the loss function might skew the results due to different error scales between inputs. For this reason, we report the regret of each algorithm w.r.t. an error measure Err rather than the absolute value of the error. More specifically, for histogram x, budget , error measure Err, and algorithm A ∈ A the regret of A is:
Main Results: In figure 6 we present our results comparing performance across different values of the privacy parameter . Each figure shows results for both policies, across different values of the non sensitive ratio ρx. Note that y-axis reports the average regret for MRE of each algorithm w.r.t. a set of 4 OSDP and 2 DP algorithms, which are averaged over the 7 histograms from DPBench-1D. We show results only for the most competitive algorithms. The dotted line corresponds to regret equal to 1 and since our results are aggregates, single algorithms will rarely have average regret equal to 1. Again we observe that low values of (i.e., bigger noise scale) favor the hybrid algorithm DAWAz. The main takeaway is that for ratios ρx ≤ 0.25 the DP algorithm outperforms the "pure" OSDP algorithm OsdpLaplaceL1. Also note that for both values the qualitative analysis of the results does not differ by much. For the above reasons, in our next results we (a) limit ρx ≥ 0.25 and (b) focus on a single value and present separate results for Close and Far policies. Next, in figures 7 and 8 we present our main results for the MRE and Rel95 error measures respectively. The privacy parameter is fixed to 1 and each figure shows the results for a different policy generator. The y-axis reports the average regret of each algorithm. For Close policies and across all non sensitive ratios and error metrics, OSDP algorithms always outperform DP algorithms, with the highest improvements in high error bins (i.e., Rel95). Even for Far policies DAWAz outperforms the best performing DP algorithm DAWA for all non-sensitive ratios. This confirms our insight behind its design, as DAWAz combines the best of both worlds: it successfully leverages the non-sensitive records to identify zero cells using OSDP algorithms to enhance a state-of-the-art DP algorithm.
In figure 9 we present results for the Close policy and fixed non-sensitive ratios across datasets. Note that these results are not aggregate and in the y-axis we report the regret for a single histogram with a fixed ρx and a fixed policy. Each group in the x-axis corresponds to a different dataset and the datasets are sorted with descending sparsity (i.e., Adult is the sparsest dataset). Again, the dotted line corresponds to regret equal to 1. In some cases an algorithm other than the ones shown in the figure achieves a regret of 1 (e.g., OsdpRR has regret 1 in Adult), but we do not show them since they have very high regrets for other datasets (and to be consistent with our previous figures). Lastly note that Nettrace is a sorted histogram, which highly favors DAWA explaining its sudden drop in regret.
In the case of the Close policy, OSDP algorithms offer significant performance improvements over using a traditional DP algorithm, across all datasets. We can see that for the sparser Adult histogram we achieve an improvement on regret of 25×, this is because the OSDP algorithms can correctly identify the bins with 0 counts, and incur 0 error on them. As the sparsity of the datasets decreases we see the gap between DAWA (the best performing DP algorithm) and the OSDP algorithms to become smaller. Lastly we observe that as ρx becomes smaller the advantages of DAWAz become more apparent -since DAWAz uses both the sensitive and the non-sensitive part of the histogram. Comparison with PDP: Finally, in Fig. 10 , we compare OsdpLaplaceL1 with the PDP algorithm Suppress (described in Section 3.4) with thresholds τ = {10 , 50 , 100 } on the benchmark datasets. In figure 3 .4 we show the two extreme cases for τ = {10 , 100 } and refer to them Suppress10 and Suppress100 respectively. We observe that Suppress starts becoming competitive for values of τ ≥ 100 , but this utility comes at a cost of 100 times worse protection from exclusion attacks (see Theorems 3.1 and 3.4).
EXTENSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
One-sided differential privacy (OSDP) presents a new direction for privacy research in that it is the first formal privacy definition that exploits the sensitive/non-sensitive dichotomy of data to allow true data to be released with formal privacy guarantees. This paper focused on motivating and defining OSDP and highlighting its advantages both in the context of data sharing tasks where differential privacy (DP) either does not apply or offers very low utility, as well as, in situations where DP performs well, but OSDP appropriately combined with DP offers significant improvement. Below we highlight some of the key extensions that we believe offer interesting directions of future work. Policies that go beyond records. In this paper, we considered policy functions that define whether or not a specific record is non-sensitive. One could extend this to the case where a policy specifies a view over the database that is non-sensitive (like in the work on authorization views [33] ), or a policy that determines that a view is sensitive (negative authorization [7] ). While there has been work on whether or not a query leaks any information about a view [29, 31] , there is no work that bounds the information to leak (like DP) about the sensitive records in such a setting. One-sided differential privacy and constraints. Theorem 3.1 showed that OSDP algorithms ensure freedom from exlusion attacks as long as an adversary believes the target record is independent of the rest of the database. As in the field of differentially private data analysis problems arise when the records in the database are correlated. For instance, in a location privacy setting, a specific non-sensitive location may be reachable only through a set of locations that are all sensitive. Revealing the fact that a user was in that location (even using our randomized response algorithm) will reveal the fact that the user was in a sensitive location in the previous time point with certainty, thus resulting in a privacy breach. Designing algorithms for OSDP in the presence of constraints in an important and interesting avenue for future work. Policy Specification and Enforcement OSDP definition and mechanisms assume the presence of an explicit policy function that partitions data into sensitive nad nonsensitive classes. As we discussed in the introduction, there are several application domains where explicit privacy policies and/or regulations exist that naturally lead to such a classification. Furthermore, good practice followed by several data collectors (e.g., e-commerce sites, search engines, etc.) empowers users to opt-in or opt-out. Such a practice as well lends itself directly to explicit policy function. Nonetheless, if we are to use OSDP in general application context, mechanisms to specify comprehensive policies that dictate data sensitivity or, better still, learn such policies, perhaps through appropriate machine learning techniques offers rich fertile area for future research. Finally, our focus in this work has been on appropriate privacy definition and mechanisms to realize OSDP. We have not focused on efficient approach to implement OSDP, especially in online setting wherein user's may dynamically ask queries.
CONCLUSIONS
In this work we presented a new privacy definition called one-sided privacy that allows for different levels of privacy guarantees (sensitive or non-sensitive) to be applied to different records in the dataset. The level of protection is determined by the value of a record, and hence, whether a record is sensitive or non-sensitive must also be hidden. This makes the privacy definition unique. We present the fundamental theory behind the privacy definition, compare it to existing definitions and present input and output perturbation algorithms. We present case studies where one-sided privacy can be used, along with effect of our algorithms on the utility of analyzing the data in these scenarios. We concluded with a discussion of extensions and open questions for future work.
APPENDIX
Extended OSDP
We propose a strict generalization of the definition of OSDP that supports neighboring datasets with different number of records and under which we can show that the parallel composition holds. Note that the inverse statement of Theorem 10.1 does not necessarily hold, i.e., (P, 2 )-OSDP does not imply (P, )-eOSDP. 
Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.4
Theorem. The Suppress algorithm with threshold τ satisfies freedom from exclusion attack for φ = τ .
Proof. Our goal is to bound the posterior odds ratio:
≤ Pr θ (r = x) Pr θ (r = y) max
Where D is drawn from θ and D1 = D ∪ {x} and D2 = D ∪ {y}, with x a sensitive record and y any record, i.e., P (x) = 0 and P (y) ∈ {0, 1}. Note that PrM(M(D1) ∈ O) = PrM(M(D) ∈ O) for Suppress, since x does not participate in the computations of M. If P (y) = 0, the output of Suppress will remain unchanged, since the sensitive record is not considered in the computations at all, i.e., maxD 1 ,D 2
